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PAYING FOR DANIEL WEBSTER:
CRITIQUING THE CONTRACT MODEL




In the short story, The Devil and Daniel Webster, a frustrated farmer,
Jabez Stone, makes a pact with the devil in exchange for worldly success. 2
When the devil appears to collect his soul, however, Jabez retains noted
litigator, Daniel Webster, to plead his case before a jury of the damned.3
Webster wins the case, Jabez keeps his soul, and the devil is left to pursue
other souls who lack the benefit of counsel.
Today, middle managers frequently "sell their souls" to the
organizations which employ them. Their capitulation to corporate culture
or their ignorance of the laws regulating market activities may ultimately
make them the target of a white collar criminal investigation. Like the
erstwhile defendant in Stephen Vincent Benet's short story, such
employees have a keen interest in securing the best counsel available.
However, unlike the fictional Daniel Webster, knowledgeable defense
counsel do not work gratis. In the real world, whether an employee has the
funds to retain Daniel Webster will likely depend on whether his employer
has a contractual obligation to advance legal fees pending a final
determination of guilt.
This paper examines the contract paradigm which is used to structure
advancement of legal fees to employees facing criminal investigation. It
posits that the use of the current contract model does little to advance the
traditional goals of advancement and prevents consideration of the
legitimate purpose of advancement-to support fair and efficient
prosecution of white collar crimes. The article proposes adoption of a duty
* Assistant Professor, St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This article was
made possible by a grant from the Pedro Arrupe Center for Business Ethics at St. Joseph's University.
1. Stephen Vincent Benet, The Devil and Daniel Webster, in 2 SELECTED WORKS OF STEPHEN
VINCENT BENET 32-46 (1942).
2. Id. at 33-34. It is interesting to note that Jabez deceives his family about the identity of the
devil by telling them that the devil is "a lawyer, come to see him." Id. at 33.
3. Id at 39-41.
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paradigm as an alternative to the contract analysis of advancement. It
argues that the use of a duty model will allow for a reevaluation of the
purpose of advancement in white collar criminal proceedings and will
encourage conscious consideration of legitimate interests beyond those of
the immediate parties to the bargain.
Part II provides a general overview of the legal framework of
advancement. Statutory regimes treating advancement are generally
permissive in nature.4 In effect, such provisions allow organizations to
determine whether, and under what circumstances, they will advance
expenses to employees facing a criminal investigation. Cognizant of the
permissive nature of the statutes, courts have uncritically adopted a contract
model,5 effectively treating advancement as the subject of a private
agreement between an organization6 and its employees. In construing such
"agreements," courts have confined their analysis to the four corners of the
document, effectively ignoring the interest of the larger community in the
efficient prosecution of white collar crime.7
Part III criticizes the use of a contract paradigm as the legal
framework for analyzing advancement. It argues that most "contracts" for
advancement fail to conform to traditional notions of contracting. More
importantly, the article posits that even where contractual niceties are
present, application of a contract model in advancement of legal fees in
criminal cases is inappropriate and distorts the prosecution of white collar
crime. Contract law focuses primarily on the interests of the parties,
ignoring or minimizing the interests of the larger society. Permitting
advancement to be distributed through a private arrangement, outside of the
scrutiny and influence of the larger community, ignores the impact of
advancement on the administration of criminal justice. In addition, using a
contract lens to analyze advancement decisions frustrates the announced
purposes of advancement and precludes consideration of the proper role of
advancement in prosecution of white collar crime.
Part IV proposes a duty model as the appropriate framework for
analyzing advancement in criminal proceedings. Specifically, this section
explores the inadequacies of current statutory regimes and suggests that
such inadequacies are the inevitable result of continued adherence to a
contract paradigm of advancement. It advocates the adoption of a duty
model as a means of recalibrating advancement to balance the interests of
multiple constituencies. Additionally, it suggests how adoption of a duty
model might influence legislation and identifies some issues which should
be addressed in defining the contour of the duty to advance fees.
4. See infra notes 28 35 and accompanying text.
5. See in/ra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
6. Unless the context requircs otherwise, as used herein the term "organization' refers to any
business entity.
7. See infra notes 98 99 and accompanying text.
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Part V of this article concludes that what is required is not a change in
"viewpoint" but a change in "viewing point"-a fresh perspective, rather
than a tweaking of a deficient model. While not a panacea, casting
advancement in terms of a duty rather than a bargainable commodity clears
the way for thoughtful consideration of the legitimate purposes of
advancement in criminal cases and its impact on larger community
interests.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
OF ADVANCING LEGAL FEES
The relationship between indemnification of employees who are
successfully vindicated of criminal liability and those advanced legal fees
to secure such vindication, is juridical dimity-a complex weave of
concepts which are at once intimately related and irreconcilably distinct.
Advancement of legal fees and other costs of litigation is a modem day
corollary to the right to indemnification.8  Advancement provides
individuals who may be eligible for indemnification with immediate
financial relief from the costs of defense.9 However, despite this common
heritage, there are significant differences between indemnification and
advancement, both in the statutory framework," which govern them, and in
the organizational context in which they occur.
Indemnification generally refers to organizational reimbursement of
judgments, settlements, expenses, and attorneys' fees incurred by directors,
officers, and employees in defending against claims arising out of or based
upon their service to the organization." In criminal proceedings,
indemnification is triggered at the conclusion of the proceedings, when the
claimant has been vindicated.12 In contrast, advancement occurs
"upstream" of a final determination of liability, at a time when it has not
yet been determined whether the claimant will qualify for
indemnification." A determination of the extent to which an organization
8. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005) ("Advancement is an especially
important corollary to indemnification. . . .").
9. Id. ("Advancement provides immediate interim relief from the personal out-of-pocket
financial burden of paying the significant on-going expenses inevitably involved with investigations
and legal proceedings.").
10. See infra notes15-55 and accompanying text.
11. Stephen A. Radin, "Sinners Who Find Religion:" Advancement of Litigation Expenses to
Corporate Officials Accused of Wrongdoing, 25 REv. LITIG. 251, 257-58 (2006) ("Indemnification
refers to reimbursement . . . of liabilities, including judgments, amounts paid in settlement, expenses,
and attorneys' fees incurred by directors, officers, employees, and sometimes even agents in the course
of their service to the corporation.").
12. EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS ANT) DIRECTORS
§19:2 (2009) (footnotes omitted) (noting that vindication can range from "wholly successful" to
"successful on the merits or otherwise") (emphasis added).
13. Homestore, Inc., 888 A.2d 204, 211-12 (observing that the right to keep advances made by an
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will advance fees to employees is frequently made at the commencement of
an internal investigation-without regard to whether a formal investigation
has been initiated.14 In effect, advancement is a prepayment of a potential
indemnification obligation of the organization.
A. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
At common law, agents were generally responsible for their own
tortuous conduct." Indemnification was not warranted merely because the
agent suffered an injury which was "connected" to employment.' 6  For an
agent to recover, it was necessary to establish that the conduct was within
one of the exceptions to the general rule: either the agent's action was
directed or authorized by the principal;'" the agent's actions benefited the
principal;'" or the failure to indemnify would be "inequitable." 9
Notwithstanding the foregoing, recovery was barred if "the agent's loss
resulted from an enterprise which he knew to be illegal." 20 Such provisions
left significant room for interpretation; it is not surprising, therefore, that
common law obligations of indemnification were both inconsistent and
unreliable. 2'
In 1939, the case of New York Dock Company v. McCollom22 created
consternation when a New York court denied indemnification to directors
who had successfully defended a derivative action.23 In response to New
organization depends on whether the recipient is entitled to indemnification).
14. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Recommended Practices for Companies and Their Counsel in
Conducting Internal Investigations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 88 (2009) (suggesting that, at the
commencement of an internal investigation, an organization send a memorandum to all affected
employees describing inter alia the organization's obligation to advance fees).
15. See, e.g., Brady v. Roosevelt Steamship Co., 317 U.S. 575, 580 (1943) ("The liability of an
agent for his own negligence has long been embedded in the law."); Gaines v. Walker, 986 F.2d 1438,
1442 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[Cjommon law generally holds agents responsible for their own wrongs.");
Hagen v. Koerner, 166 A.2d 784, 786 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960) ("[T]here is a general rule in the
law of agency that an employer cannot be compelled to reimburse and employee for damages the
employee may be obligated to pay. . . resulting from his own negligent conduct.).
16. Hagen, 166 A.2d at 786 ("[T]here is a general rule in the law of agency that an employer
cannot be compelled to reimburse and employee for damages the employee may be obligated to
pay ... resulting from his own negligent conduct.").
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY: WHEN DUTY OF INDEMNITY ExiSTS § 439(c) (1957).
18. Id § 439(e).
19. Id
20. Id § 440(c).
21. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Current Status oJ Corporate Directors' Right to Indemnification, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1068-69 (1956) (noting that common law grounds for directors' right to
indemnification is a "welter of confusion"); BRODSKY & ADAMSK, supra note 12, at § 19:1 (observing
that at common law the right to reimbursement was uncertain); John L. Cornell & James J. Little,
Indemnification of Fiduciary and Employee Litigation Costs Under ERISA, 25 B.C. L. REv. 1, 14-15
(1983) (stating that while some courts routinely denied indemnification, other courts permitted recovery
when the claimant had successfully defended the action).
22. 16 N.YS. 2d 844 (1939).
23. Id at 849 (noting that unless a director could demonstrate that in successfully defending
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York Dock, state legislatures enacted statutes mandating some level of
indemnification and permitting advancement.2 4 The primary objective of
the statutes was to affirm the right of corporations to indemnify or advance
fees; they were not an effort to limit indemnification or define
advancement. To the contrary, the statutes cleared the way for the parties
to enter into agreements providing for indemnification as they saw fit. In
interpreting the New York indemnification statute, which was passed in the
wake of New York Dock, one court noted that organizational
indemnification was an "exercise of a common-law right of freedom of
contract and [the statute] is merely declaratory thereof ... ."26
Advancement provisions embedded in the statutes authorizing
indemnification seem to garner little notice; they were permitted as a
logical extension to the principle of indemnification. 27  Today, many
states 28 follow the approach of the Model Business Corporation Act
("MBCA") 29 and Delaware law,30 which permit, but do not require,
corporations to advance payment of fees and expenses prior to a final
determination on the merits. Such statutes are frequently termed
"permissive." 31
In contrast to the Delaware model of permissive advancement,
seventeen states have adopted some variant 32 of an "opt out" model of
himself he conferred a benefit on the corporation, he was not entitled to reimbursement of costs).
24. Chester F. Reylea, Comment, Indemnification of Management for Litigation Expenses, 52
MICH. L. REv. 1023, 1029-30 (1954) (observing that New York Dock prompted adoption of statutes and
by-laws requiring indemnification) (citations omitted); Pamela H. Bucy, Indemnification of Corporate
Executives Who Have Been Convicted of Crimes: An Assessment and Proposal, 24 IND. L. REV. 279,
283 (1991) (observing that New York Dock sparked a "new generation" of statutes with expansive
coverage); WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, 2 LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS § 22.02 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that all fifty states have enacted legislation treating
indemnification)(citations omitted).
25. Bucy, supra note 24, at 319 (arguing that statutory limitations on improper advances are not
"meaningful"). But see Dale Oesterle, Limits on n Corporation 's Protection of Its Directors and
Officers From Personal Liability, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 513, 536 (1983) (suggesting a lack of a cohesive
purpose laws treating indemnification and advancement).
26. Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N.Y. 395, 405 (1953) (Carswell, J.,
concurring).
27. Kaung v. Cole Nat. Corp., 884 A.2d 500, 509 (Del. 2005) (observing that advancement fills the
gap prior to a determination of mandatory advancement); see Richard A. Rossman, Matthew J. Lund &
Kathy K. Lochman, A Primer on Advancement of Defense Costs: The Rights and Duties of Officers and
Corporations, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 29, 30-36 (2007) (describing the typical models used for
advancement).
28. Rossman et al., supra note 27, at 34-36, 54-55 (identifying the advancement models used in
each state).
29. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.58(a) (2007).
30. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8 § 145 (e) (2009).
31. Rossman et al., supra note 27, at 34 ("[A]dvancement statutes of most states are described as
'"permissive" because they establish only the ability of a corporation to grant advancement".).
32. Id at 34--36, 54-55 (identifying some of the variations within the "opt-out" model of
advancement).
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advancement. 33 This approach mandates or presumes advancement of fees
unless the organization affirmatively "opts out" of the statutory scheme
through explicit language in the organizational documents. 34
Both the Delaware model and the "opt-out" model vest organizations
with enormous discretion in fashioning contracts for advancement."
Corporations have used their discretion to cap legal expenditures, limit
selection of counsel and require approval of expenses." Such limitations
are not barred by the statutes provided they are clearly worded and not an
abuse of discretion.37
Claimants seeking advancement must conform to the procedural
requirements of both the operative state statute and the company's own
policies. Statutory procedures, however, are frequently a matter of form
over substance.38  The MBCA,3 1 the Delaware statute, 40 and at least forty
states 4 1require officers and directors requesting advancement to execute an
undertaking to repay the advance in the event that indemnification is not
warranted. However, the statutes do not prescribe a standard of solvency,
require collateral, or specify minimum financial requirements. 4 2  In the
context of criminal proceedings, undertakings to repay advances are
particularly hollow.43  Recipients who are found ineligible for
33. Rossman et al., supra note 27, at 54 (identifying state statutes utilizing an "opt-out" model for
advancement).
34. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 1701.13(E)(5)(a) (2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.521,
subd. (3), (4) (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10.852(B) (2004).
35. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145(e) (2009) (providing that expenses shall be paid "upon
such terms and conditions, if any, as the corporation deems appropriate."); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 858(c) (2007) (providing that a corporation may limit any rights to indemnification or advancement
through a provision in the articles of incorporation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(11) (2003) (prohibiting
indemnification or advancement which is inconsistent with any corporate action which limits or restricts
indemnification or advancement);
36. Limitations on advancement are not transparent and most of the restrictions are disclosed in the
process of litigation contesting the limitations. See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330,
345 (S.D. N.Y. 2006) (referring to KMPG letter to employees that it would pay up to $400,000 in legal
fees); Chamison v. Healthtrust Inc., 735 A.2d 912, 916 (Ch. Del. 1999) (citing policy of corporation to
pay legal fees of firms selected by the corporation).
37. Chamison, 735 A.2d at 922 (noting that in the absence of restrictive language, a corporation
has broad discretion in requiring use of specified counsel, but finding that the corporation had abused
such discretion).
38. Bucy, supra note 24, at 316-19 (arguing that it is easy for organizations to circumvent
statutory standards).
39. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.53(a)(2) (2007).
40. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145(e) (2009).
41. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.53 cmt. statutory comparison (2007).
42. Bucy, supra note 24, at 316 ("[S]tatutes impose no meaningful requirement or mechanism for
reclaiming such advances. "), Knepper & Bailey, supra note 24, § 22.14 ("[T]he ability of the
director or officer to repay the advanced amount is generally not a factor [in the decision to advance
fees] since the contractual by-law provision is not subject to the fiduciary duties of the appruving
directors.") (citations omitted).
43. Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives Defense Costs
and the Federal Courts, 7 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 55, 80 (2006) (noting that executive's assets may
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indemnification because of a determination of guilt will presumably have
few resources from which to repay any advances.
Except for the formality of an undertaking to repay the advance if the
claimant is ultimately found to be ineligible, statutes impose few
procedural obstacles to granting advancement. Delaware law is totally
permissive; it allows advancement upon such terms and conditions, "if
any," as the corporation deems appropriate." The MBCA 4 5 and states
adopting that model4 6 require an affirmation of the officer's good faith
belief that the conduct under investigation is not ineligible for
indemnification. Other states require organizations to make an independent
determination at the time of the advancement request of whether any facts
known at the time would make the claimant ineligible for
indemnification. 47  The requirement for such determinations, while well
intentioned, may have little impact on the decision to advance fees;
corporations effectively operate on the presumption that a targeted
employee will qualify for indemnification.4 8 While such a presumption
may be appropriate at the initiation of an investigation, 4 9 once made, the
statutes do not require reevaluation. 0 Once initiated, any change in the
existence or scope of advancement is made at the discretion of the
organization and not as a result of a statutory requirement.
Statutes are also silent as to the duration of advancement obligations.
A contract may require advancement to continue even after it appears that
the recipient will be ineligible for indemnification. In Bergonzi v. Rite Aid
Corp., for example, the court granted the claimant's request for
advancement of fees, despite the claimant's guilty plea admitting to
falsification of financial statements and backdating an employment
agreement entitling him to millions of dollars.52 In making its
determination, the court relied on contractual language which provided for
advancement until "a court of competent jurisdiction ultimately determines
"evaporate" as a result of a criminal prosecution).
44. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145 (e) (2009).
45. MODEL BUS. CoRP. ACT § 8.53(a)(1) (2007).
46. See Rossman et al., supra note 27, at 55 (identifying those states which require a claimant's
affirmation that her conduct will not bar indemnification).
47. Id at 38 (identifying the states which have adopted this procedure).
48. Mae Kuykendall, Symmetry and Dissonance in Corporate Law: Perfecting the Exoneration of
Directors, Corrupting Indemnification and Straining the Framework of Corporate Law, 1998 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 443, 552 (1998) (observing that corporations usually advance fees with little "practical
fact finding" on whether a claimant is eligible for indemnification).
49. Id. (arguing that "there is a useful conceptual clarity in allowing an advance of expenses
without reference to any standard of conduct").
50. See Bucy, supra note 24, at 318 (suggesting that that any meaningful evaluation of eligibility
for indemnification would he "perilous" and could take as long as the criminal investigation itself).
51. Bergonzi v. Rite Aid Corp., No. Civ. A.20453-NC, 2003 WL 22407303 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20,
2003).
52. Id at *2.
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in a final judgment that I am not entitled to indenmification."5 Since the
acceptance of the guilty plea by the criminal court could not be deemed to
be a final determination on the matter of indemnification, 54 the claimant
continued to be entitled to advancement.5 5
B. THE CONTRACT PARADIGM
Operating within a statutory environment that permits, but does not
require, advancement, courts have treated advancement as a matter of
contract between an organization and its agents. The use of a contract
model to describe advancement appears to have merited little judicial head-
scratching. In the context of officers and directors, the contract structure
reflected the reality of the transaction; alarmed by New York Dock, and
influenced perhaps by the machinations of the insurance industry,56
directors and officers understood the importance of indemnification and
advancement and demanded such protections as a condition of service."
As the furor over the New York Dock decision subsided, soothed by
statutes which firmly established the power of corporations to advance
fees,58 organizations, motivated in part by a burgeoning catalogue of white
collar crimes, 59 found it necessary and desirable to expand advancement
beyond the executive ranks.60 In effect, the contract model of advancement
also expanded beyond express, negotiated, agreements to include
arrangements which were more fluid, and which lacked the conditions for
effective bargaining. 61
Today contracts requiring advancement of legal fees generally fall into
three categories: (1) provisions contained in employment or consulting
agreements which predate the initiation of a criminal investigation; (2)
53. Bergonzi, 2003 WL 22407303, at *3.
54. Id.
55. Accord U.S. v. Weismann, No. S294CR-760 (CSH), 1997 WL 334966, at *16 (S.D. N. Y. June
6, 1997) (holding that claimant was entitled to advancement despite a finding of guilt pending final
adjudication).
56. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnfication of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L. J. 1078, 1078 (1968) ( suggesting that an ad campaign by
insurance industry raised awareness of directors of the risks of corporate service).
57. Edward Paul Mattar 111 & John Francis Hilson, 46 J. RISK & INS. 411, 411 (1979) (noting that
concern over personal liability became so pronounced that directors were reluctant to serve) (citation
omitted).
58. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory responses to
N. Y. Dock.
59. Bucy, supra note 24, at 294-95, 304 (arguing that blurring of civil and criminal liability and
increases in the number of strict liability cnmes have made it easier to find the requisite intent for
permissive indemnification); Regina A. Robson, Crime and Punishment: Rehabilitating Retribution as
a Justijfication for Organizational Criminal Liability, 47 AM. Bus. L. J. 109, n.182 (2010) (noting that
there are currently over ten thousand administrative regulations which are criminally enforceable).
60. See injra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 129 35 and accompanying text.
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bylaw provisions which are effectuated by board resolutions or by a
contract executed in the shadow of an impending investigation; or (3)
implied-in-fact agreements based on an organization's past conduct.
Where advancement is treated in explicit agreements that precede the
onset of the criminal investigation, the contract model seems apposite.
Advancement is frequently one of many executive perquisites that is
negotiated in the context of an employment or consulting agreement. Such
contracts generally require no special approval beyond that typically
required for executive compensation.6 As with any element of executive
compensation, the vigor of such negotiation may vary.6 As one
commentator noted, "advancement of legal fees is among the more
egregious elements in the golden parachute of perks that executives
negotiate at less than arms-length with a supine or self-interested board.""
The threat of an impending criminal investigation can further distort
the bargaining process. Organizations frequently enter into explicit
advancement and indemnification agreements in the shadow of a criminal
investigation whose scope may not be fully delineated. While many
statutes require approval of a "disinterested" directors or an assessment by
"independent" legal counsel as a condition to such agreements,6 5 such
provisions do not guarantee meaningful bargaining. Frequently, the
organization is represented by officers or directors who, recognizing the
risk of a burgeoning investigation which might eventually include them,
find it easy to agree to generous advancement provisions. Moreover,
even when advancement decisions are made by "independent" counsel, the
environment may be one which is "sympathetic" to the problems of
corporate management. In reality, "independent" may merely mean not
an employee of the corporation. 68
Despite statutory procedural requirements, high level executives who
understand the risks of criminal prosecution are well positioned to secure
expansive advancement provisions. The series of cases, captioned United
62. Oesterle, supra note 25, at 543 (observing that contracts dealing with future litigation are
subject to the rules on officers' and directors' compensation). But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.511
subd (2004) (requiring disclosure-but not approval-of actual advances to shareholders at the next
regular meeting after the payment has been made).
63. Kuykendall, supra note 48, at 536 ("Like other compensation, indemnification is subject to
legal constraints, but the restraints are loose, affected as much by public opinion and an internal sense
of social limits ... as by regulation.").
64. Margulies, supra note 43, at 81-82.
65. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145(f) (2009) (requiring approval by shareholders,
disinterested directors or "otherwise"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.521 subdiv. 6 (2004) (providing for
approval of disinterested members of the board and in some cases a "special" counsel).
66. Margulies, supra note 43, at 80 (observing that directors, who are also interested in being held
harmless, often accede to managers' requests for advancement to defend against criminal charges).
67. Bishop, supra note 56, at 1080 (arguing that selection of independent counsel may favor
corporate lawyers who have a "sympathetic understanding" of management).
68. Id
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States v. Stein,6 9 provides a rare and insightful glimpse into the manner in
which explicit agreements on advancement are negotiated. Stein grew out
of a Senate investigation of accounting firm KMPG for its role in
promoting illegal tax shelters.7 Anticipating possible criminal charges,
KPMG decided to "clean house"" and asked Mr. Stein, then Deputy Chair
of the firm, and other high level managers to leave the firm.72  in
negotiating Mr. Stein's "retirement" package, KMPG was represented in
the negotiation by the current chairman who, incidentally, had selected Mr.
Stein for his position." Mr. Stein was represented by counsel whose fees
for the representation were paid by KMPG.7 4 The negotiation was
described as "very friendly."" The resulting agreement provided, inter
alia,16 that in the event that Mr. Stein was a defendant in any suits based
upon his activities on behalf of the firm, he would be represented at
KPMG's expense, by counsel "acceptable to both him and KMPG."77
There was no cap on Mr. Stein's legal expenses. In contrast, advancement
for other KPMG employees who did not have explicit agreements78 was
capped at four hundred thousand dollars, 7 9 and was conditioned on their
"cooperation" with the investigation.80
While some advancement obligations are embedded in explicit
agreements, for most employees advancement is governed by bylaw
provisions." Such provisions frequently parrot the language of the state
statutes, essentially giving the company "permission" to advance fees to the
fullest extent of the law.82 In "opt out" states which require advancement,
69. U.S. v. Stein ("Stein 1"), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D. N.Y. 2006), affd, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.
2008); U.S. v. Stein ("Stein IF'), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D. N.Y. 2006); U.S. v. Stein ("Stein IH"), 495
F. Supp. 2d 390, 402 (S.D. N.Y. 2007).
70. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (citing STAFF OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 109TH
CONG., THE ROLE OF PROF. FIRMS IN THE U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY (Comm. Print 2005)).
71. Idat 339.
72. Id At least one other executive, Mr. Smith, received a retirement package similar to Mr.
Stein's. Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
73. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at n.23.
74. Id
75. Id
76. In addition, the agreement provided for consulting payments totaling $3.6 million dollars over
three years, and continuing coverage under the company's D& 0 insurance. Id at 339.
77. Id
78. Id at 356 n.119 (noting that except for Mr. Stein who had an express contract providing
advancement, defendants based their claims on implied-in-fact agreements with KPMG).
79. Id at 345.
80. Id
81. See, e.g., Neal v. Neumann Med. Ctr. 667 A.2d 479, 480-81 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (bylaw
provision providing for advancement); Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 341 (Del. 1983)
(bylaw providing for advancement); Fid. Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. Felicetti, 830 F. Supp. 262, 264-65
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (corporate bylaw providing for advancement).
82. Rossman et al., supra note 27, at 34 (noting that frequently organizational documents simply
adopt the statutory language which authorizes advancement).
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entities may use organizational documents to modify the statutory regime
or eschew it altogether.8
Bylaw provisions have been interpreted as a matter of contract. 84
While treating a bylaw as a "contract" between a corporation and investors
seems appropriate, the logic of this approach is problematic when the
"parties" to the contract are an organization and its employees or agents.
Unlike the employee handbook or perhaps the Code of Conduct, there is
nothing to suggest that employees or candidates for employment review the
bylaws in making their decision to accept employment. Nonetheless,
courts have extended the contractual analysis used to interpret bylaws to
advancement without further examination or analysis. 5
Where advancement is authorized by a bylaw, the organization
normally takes additional action to effectuate the terms of the bylaw.
Anticipating a criminal investigation, organizations frequently appoint a
committee ("Independent Committee") to conduct an internal
investigation.1 The Independent Committee typically communicates the
"rules of the road" to employees, advising them of the investigation,
encouraging "cooperation,"" and describing the circumstances under
which the organization will pay for separate counsel for the targeted
employee." While arguably "contractual," such arrangements are a far cry
from arms-length agreements. Faced with the prospect of a criminal
investigation, mid-level managers with limited resources may have little
stomach for vigorous bargaining. Anticipating charges against the
83. Rossman et al., supra note 27, at 35-36 (noting that in opting out of statutory schemes, use of
precise language is critical).
84. See, e.g., Ellingwood v. Wolf s Head Oil Ref.Co., Inc. 38 A.2d 743, 747 (Del. 1944) ("In
interpreting the meaning of charter provisions the same method is applied as that which is followed in
interpreting written contracts generally."); Centaur Partners IV v. Nat'l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923,
928 (Del. 1990) ("Corporate charters and bylaws are contracts among the shareholders of a corporation
and the general rules of contract interpretation are held to apply"); Heritage Lake Prop. Owners' Ass'n
v. York, 859 N.E. 2d 763, 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) ("[Wjhen construing corporate organizational
documents, the general rules of contract interpretation apply."); Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 830 F.
Supp. at 268 ("[T]here is nothing to preclude a corporation from contracting through its bylaws, articles
of incorporation or by private contract to provide for mandatory advancements.").
85. See, e.g., TBG Inc. v. Bendis, Civ. A. No. 89-2423-0, 1991 WL 34199, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 19,
1991) (citing contractual concept that subsequent changes in law become part of the contract in
interpreting bylaw provision providing for advancement); Hibbert, 457 A.2d at 342-43 (utilizing the
rules which govern the interpretation of contracts to construe a corporate bylaw containing provisions
on indemnification and advancement); Neal, 667 A.2d at 484 (noting that Pennsylvania nonprofit
corporations are permitted to "contract through their bylaws to indemnify their corporate officers and
directors.") (Smith, J., dissenting on other grounds).
86. Am. Coll. Trial Lawyers, supra note 14, at 83 (recommending, inter alia, formation of an
Independent Committee to conduct an investigation and communicate with employees).
87. Id. (suggesting that the Independent Committee communicate an expectation of employee
cooperation, a description of what constitutes cooperation and an announcement that failure to
cooperate might result in termination).
88. Id (suggesting that the Independent Committee make an early determination of the
circumstances under which the company will pay for separate counsel for employees).
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organization itself, corporations have free rein to utilize advancement to
reinforce employee loyalty89 and to ensure that the individual's legal
strategy comports with the organization's perceived self-interest. 0
Absent an express contract, or a bylaw authorizing advancement,
claimants seeking advancement must establish the existence of an implied-
in-fact" contract to advance fees. Implied-in-fact contracts have the same
legal effect as express agreements;92 however, the determination of whether
an implied-in-fact contract exists requires inquiry into the behavior of the
parties and an assessment of whether such conduct infers mutual consent.93
Consequently, proving the existence of an implied-in-fact agreement can be
both difficult and expensive, requiring scrutiny of prior practices, and a
determination of whether such practices created a reasonable inference of
an agreement between the parties.94
Cases adjudicating implied-in-fact agreements for advancement in
criminal cases are scant. Again the Stein cases provide a good illustration
of the challenges of establishing an implied-in-fact agreement to advance
fees. In Stein, fifteen employees asserted the existence of implied-in-fact
agreements with their employer, KiPMG, to advance expenses incurred in
connection with a criminal investigation arising from their employment.95
In rejecting the district court's exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over the
advancement claims of the KMPG employees, 96 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit identified some of the difficulties in
establishing an implied-in-fact agreement for advancement, noting that "it
would require scrutinizing decades of. . . conduct, determining the states of
minds of hundreds of individuals [and] applying the findings from those
inquiries to the particular circumstances of each appellee "" Clearly,
such agreements are highly fact specific and subjective. As a result, it is
not inconceivable that two targeted employees within the same firm could
89. Margulies, supra note 43, at 79 ("[A]dvancement of legal fees . promotes loyalty . and
prevents the government from 'peeling off players who might wish to cooperate with the prosecutor.").
90. See supra notes 178-87 and accompanying text.
91. Implied-in-fact contracts are those in which the "intention to make a promise may be
manifested by implication from other circumstances " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 4 cmt. a (1979).
92. Id. ("The distinction [between express and implied contracts] involves, however, no difference
in legal effect . . . .").
93. Id (noting that a promise may be inferred from a course of dealing, a course of performance or
trade usage).
94. George P. Costigan, Jr., Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Mutual Assent, 33 HARV. L. REV. 376,
381 82 (1920) (arguing that a principle distinction between express and implied contracts is in the
mode of proving a contract exists). See also supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text for a description
of the proof required to establish an implied-in-fact contract.
95. Stein v. KPMG, 486 F.3d 753, 757(2d Cir. 2007) (noting that fifteen of the sixteen employees
claiming advancement based their claim on implied-in-fact agreements).
96. Id at 761 (holding that ancillary jurisdiction was not warranted because, inter a/ia, the claims
involved "garden variety state law claims").
97. Id at 761 62.
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have substantially different implied-in-fact "agreements" to advance fees.
Bounded by a contract analysis, there is nothing to suggest such intra-firm
inequities are inappropriate, and few mechanisms to address such disparate
outcomes.98
C. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ADVANCEMENT CONTRACTS
Relying on a contractual model, courts have treated advancement of
fees in criminal matters as a perquisite of employment and an appropriate
subject for a private bargain. Foregoing sweeping pronouncements based
on access to counsel, 99 courts have focused instead on the mundane task of
interpreting the expressed intention of the parties as discerned within the
four corners of the document.100
The framework for interpreting contracts providing for advancement
was set forth in the influential case of Citadel Holding Corporation v.
Roven.o'0 At issue was an indemnity agreement between Citadel Holding,
and its director, Albert Roven, which required advancement of attorneys'
fees and expenses incurred in defending "any action, suit, proceeding or
investigation."1 02 A separate section of the agreement specifically excluded
indemnification for any liability or expense related to a violation of Section
16(b) of the Securities Act of 1934.103 Roven sued Citadel when Citadel
refused to advance expenses incurred in Roven's defense of a Section 16(b)
claim brought against him by Citadel for improperly trading in the
securities of the company. 04  In upholding the decision of the Superior
Court to compel advancement, the Delaware Supreme Court found that,
98. The equitable doctrines of good faith and fair dealing which have traditionally be used to
ameliorate more egregious abuses of discretion are essentially tools of contract interpretation and do not
affect a determination of whether a contract can be inferred in fact. See infra notes 141-46 and
accompanying text.
99. Those cases which have relied on access to counsel as a justification for advancement have
arisen in the context of insurers seeking to deny advancement which was allegedly required by an
insurance policy. See, e.g., Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 649 F. Supp. 1460, 1486 (W.D. Pa. 1986),
afd, 836 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1987), (noting that requiring the employee to pay their expenses as incurred
would be "unconscionable"); Flintkote Co. v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 1976 WL 16591, at *4 (N. Y. Sup.,
July 27, 1976), aff'd, 391 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1977) (observing that public policy is served by having
executive properly represented, despite his conviction on antitrust charges).
100. See, e.g., Citadel Holding Corporation v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 824 (Del. 1992) ("When
construing a contract, and unless a contrary intent appears, we will give words their ordinary
meaning."); Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 343 (Del. 1983) (noting that if a bylaw is
unambiguous, the court will not search out the parties' intention); Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., No. Civ.
A.023-N, 2004 WL 556733, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2004), aff'd, Homestore Inc. v. Tafeen, 886 A.2d
502 (Del. 2005) (refusing to reinterpret loosely drafted bylaws to benefit organizational drafter).
101. 603 A.2d 818 (Del. 1992).
102. Id at 820.
103. Id ("The Corporation shall not be obligated ..,. to make payment in regard to any liabiliy. ..
for an accounting of profits made from purchase or sale by the Agent of securities of the Corporation
within the meaning of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. .. )
104. Id. at 821.
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while the agreement with Roven may have made violations of Section
16(b) ineligible for indemnification, the exclusion did not affect Roven's
right to advancement of funds for defense of such a claim." Most
significantly, the court noted that the purpose of the contract was to provide
the claimant with "greater protection than he already enjoyed under the
Certificate of Incorporation, Bylaws and insurance provided by Citadel." 1 6
In effect, Citadel makes clear that the parties could contractually expand
protection beyond what was provided by the corporate organizational
documents.
In subsequent cases, courts have adhered to the contractual
framework, unwilling to "rescue sinners who find religion"'0 7  by
reinterpreting contractual provision to take account of extraneous matters
outside the scope of the agreement. Courts have required organizations to
advance fees despite allegations that the claimant's action was motivated
by personal greed;' that the claimant fraudulently induced the
organization to enter into the advancement agreement;'09 that payment of
advancement might result in financial hardship to the organization;" 0 that
the advancement payment was subject to set-off by the organization;"' and
after a claimant admitted under oath to deliberate falsification of financial
statements.'12 As one court noted, the organization itself must strike the
"proper balance between seeking able persons to serve as directors and
officers and safeguarding the expenses advanced by the company . . . .""1
The balance the court refers to is solely between the organization and its
employees; strikingly absent is any reference to the interests of the
community beyond the office tower.
The efficacy of the contractual framework in insulating advancement
decisions from the interests of the larger community was on display in the
105. Citadel, 603 A.2d at 826 (holding that contract exclusions relating to finding of liability under
the Securities Act did not affect right to advancement prior to determination of liability).
106. Id at 823.
107. Tafeen, 2004 WL 556733, at *1.
108. Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys., No. Civ. A. 19467, 2002 WL 1358761, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 18,
2002) (noting the existence of a consistent line of authority upholding the right to advancement even
when misconduct is motivated by personal greed) (citations omitted).
109. Tafeen, 2004 WL 556773, at *5 (observing that while fraudulent inducement to enter an
employment agreement may be the subject of a separate action, it was not a defense to a claim for
advancement).
110. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Sunbeam Corp., Civ. A. No. 17048, 1999 LEXIS 126, at *17 (Del. Ch.
June 23, 1999) ("Hardship . . is not a factor that this Court has typically considered in determining
whether to provide for advancement of fees "); Tafeen, 2004 WL 556733, at *10 (holding that
severe financial hardship is not a cognizable defense to a claim for advancement of fees).
111. Kaung, 884 A.2d at 502 (holding that the summary nature of proceeding for advancement
made award of recoupment inappropriate).
112. Bergonzi v. Rite Aid Corp., No. Civ. A.20453-NC, 2003 WL 22407303, at *3 (Dcl. Ch. Oct.
20, 2003) (holding that contract providing for advancement prohibits an inquiry whether claimant will
qualify for indemnification).
113. Tafeen, 2004 WL 556733, at *3 n.7 (emphasis in the original).
288 Vol. 7:2
ADVANCEMENT OF LEGAL FEES
Stein cases. At issue was a policy, popularly known as the Thompson
Memorandum,"4 which permitted the United States Attorney to consider an
organization's advancement of fees to "culpable""' employees in decisions
to charge the organization itself."' The increased scrutiny of advancement
decisions resulting from the Thompson Memorandum effectively pressured
employers to structure advancement to curry favor with prosecutors."' In a
carefully crafted opinion, the court rejected the policies of the Thompson
Memorandum, finding that the policy, combined with the actions of the
prosecutor, violated the constitutional rights of the targeted employees."8
Whatever its constitutional shortcomings, the Thompson
Memorandum represented an effort, however ham-handed,"' to scrutinize
the advancement decision and to recalibrate advancement to consider
interests beyond those of the organization and its employee. By rejecting
the policies of the Thompson Memorandum, the Stein court implicitly
affirmed advancement as a private matter between an organization and its
employees, effectively insulated from outside scrutiny.'2 0 This fact has led
one commentator to suggest that explicit contracts requiring advancement
offers the best protection against prosecutor scrutiny of advancement
decisions.' 2 ' In effect, the contractual structure of advancement provides a
virtually impenetrable barrier to external scrutiny of advancement decisions
and a formidable obstacle to consideration of larger community interests.
114. Larry D. Thompson, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, DEPT. OF
JUSTICE (Jan. 20, 2003), www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson
Memorandum].
115. The Thompson Memorandum did not define "culpable."
116. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 114, at VI (B) (footnote omitted). An exception was
made in those instances where advancement of attorneys' fees was required by law. Id.
117. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 345 (noting that the Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the
prosecutor resulted in the employer capping fees and conditioning payment of legal expenses of the
targeted employees on their cooperation with the government).
118. Id. at 382. ("[T]he Thompson Memorandum and the activities of the USAO . . . violated the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.").
119. The Thompson Memorandum was the subject of widespread criticism. See e.g., Earl J. Silbert
& Demme Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks: The Impact of Corporate Privilege
Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225, 1226-27 (2006) (labeling the policies
of the Thompson Memorandum as a trampling of constitutional rights of individuals); George Ellard,
Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary: False Statements to Impede Government
Investigations, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 985, 991 (2005) (calling the Thompson Memorandum a seismic
shift from an accusatorial to an inquisitional systems of justice); Noah D. Stein, Prosecutorial Ethics
and the McNulty Memo: Should The Government Scrutinize An Organization's Payment of Its
Employees' Attorneys' Fees?, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 3245, 3273-74 (2007) (observing that policy
embodied in Thompson Memorandum encouraged a premature labeling of an employee as "culpable").
120. Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 402 (noting that even when operating under the Thompson
Memorandum, prosecutors did not demand that an organization breach an explicit contractual obligation
to advance fees).
121. Darryl K. Brown. Challenges to the Attorney-Client Relationship: Threats to Sound Advice?,
57 DEPAUL L. REV. 365, 388-89 (2008) (arguing that contract law provides courts with an easier
judicial mechanism to discourage prosecutor interference with advancement than does constitutional
law).
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III. DEFICIENCIES OF THE CONTRACT MODEL
There is a legal "fondness" for the construct of a contract as an
explanation of social relationships.12 2 A contractual framework has served
as the legal infrastructure for consideration of numerous relationships.123 in
the context of advancement, however, such categorization is misleading
and short-sighted. Not only does the "process" of most advancement
transactions not resemble traditional contracts, using a contract construct
fails to consider the impact of advancement of legal fees on the
organization, the targeted employee and the criminal justice system as a
whole. Even more important than whether advancement "fits" within the
contract mold is the risk that the use of a contract analysis may frustrate the
announced goals of advancement and preclude consideration of what role
advancement should serve in promoting the interests of the larger
community.
A. THE CONTRACT CLASSIFICATION
Identifying a transaction or a relationship as a "contract" is to
circumscribe the nature of the analysis, to create a filter through which all
analysis must pass. As one scholar observed:
To call a thing a contract is to make a legal classification. It is to carry
out that most basic step in what is sometimes called legal reasoning .
It is to make a move in the mind game which . . goes something like
this: given that I cannot efficiently treat this thing as sul generis, with
what other thing or roup of things can I best associate it for less-than-
individual treatment.
Such classification, while having the virtue of intellectual efficiency,
also carries with it significant risks.125  Perhaps the greatest risk in
classification as a tool of legal analysis is the necessity of focusing on a
122. Eli Bukspan, The Notion of Trust as a Comprehensive Theory of Contract and Corporate Law:
A New Approach to the Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contract, 2 HASTINGs Bus. L. J.
229, 236 (2006) (arguing that contract law is the foundation of most legal and social interaction).
123. See, e.g., id at 233 (observing that a corporation is the "quintessential embodiment of
contract."); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1980) (noting the current trend to analyze corporations as a "nexus of
contracts"); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. LAW &
ECONOMIcs 425, 427 (1993) (arguing that fiduciary "duties" are a variant of contract law in which
courts supply the terms that the parties would have negotiated with respect to the subject); Arthur Allen
Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 131 (1970) (arguing that classification of consumer
transactions as "contracts" is appropriate).
124. Leff, supra note 123, at 132 (emphasis in the original) (footnotes omitted).
125. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,1988
DUKE L J. 879, 879 80 (applying contract jurisprudence to fiduciary obligations is "misleading" and
"provides no rationale for further development . . . ."); Leff, supra note 123, at 132 (arguing that legal
classification which groups "identical" things is a "sticky business," fraught with risks).
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few "identifying criteria" which are the basis of the classification, while
minimizing or ignoring others.12 6
The traditional definition of a contract as "a promise or set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy ."127 is both
simplistic and circular. It provides no guidance on which promises should
be enforceable and what constitutes an appropriate topic for a transaction.
In considering which transactions should be classified as contracts, scholars
have focused more on the characteristics of the transaction than the subject
matter. As one commentator noted, "the common law's category 'contract'
was developed as a method of segregating, for a particular predictable
treatment, contemplated trading transactions between free-willed persons in
an assumedly free enterprise, free market economic system."' 28
Implicit in the contracting process is what one scholar has termed,
"the bordered relationship"' 2 9-a transaction characterized by "limited
bargains which allocated discrete rights and duties."130 In such
relationships, the parties have the autonomy and incentive to actively
pursue their own interests. In contrast to such classic criteria of contracts
are what have been termed "relational arrangements"-interdependent,
longer lasting relationships in which the parties may have relinquished
some degree of autonomy.'3  One commentator has defined a "relational
contract" as a "relation in which exchange occurs." 32 In contrast to classic
conceptions of contracting, in which a relationship is created because of a
bargain between the parties, in the context of the firm exchanges occur
because of the relationship of the parties necessitates any number of
exchanges which are both vague and dynamic.' 3 Because the exchanges
are embedded in complex relationships,134 rather than negotiated in an
arms-length transaction, the parties are frequently unable or unwilling to
"reduc[e] important terms of the arrangement to well defined
126. Leff, supra note 123, at 136 (positing that once an item or transaction is "classified," it is
tempting to ignore significant differences among transactions within the class).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: CONTRACT DEFINED § 1 (1979).
128. Leff, supra note 123, at 138 (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 138 (observing that the "bordered relationship" is characterized by "the deal," rather than
long term, non-limited relationships).
130. Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing Vision of
the Right to Counsel, 105 HARv. L. REV. 670, 673 (1992).
131. Id. at 674 (noting that classical theory of contracts may not accommodate long-term
arrangements with fluid obligations).
132. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory, Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 877,
878 (2000) (defining a contract as a relationship in which exchange occurs).
133. Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View Of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465, 467 (1985)
("Contract planning and contract law, at best, stand at the margin of important, long-term continuing
business relationships.").
134. Macneil, supra note 132, at 884-86 (arguing that every transaction is embedded in a complex
relationship which must be considered in analyzing contracts); Macaulay, supra note 133, at 468
(arguing that "relational sanctions" outweigh contract law in determining behavior in the firm).
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obligations."' Force fitting such relational "agreements" into a contract
model distorts contractual jurisprudence while leaving unaddressed
whether such a framework supports or impedes public policy objectives.
The "contract" for advancement appears to straddle both the bordered
relationship and the more fluid relational arrangements. Directors and
executives frequently negotiate provisions treating advancement as part of
an employment or consulting contract, or as a stand-alone agreement.136 In
the context of advancement, such explicit agreements appear to typify the
"bordered relationship" in which the rights and interests of the parties are
delineated and defined through arm's length negotiation.' 37 However, for
most employees, the advancement arrangement bears little resemblance to
an agreement between autonomous parties which is "knowingly" and
"freely made."' For all but directors and high level executives, the
"agreement" to advance fees is but one part of the "relational contract"
with the employer-the antithesis of the traditional view of a contract as a
bordered relationship.' 3 9 Moreover, unlike more traditional subjects of the
employment contract-wages, hours, benefits-most employees lack both
the knowledge and the audacity to even discuss advancement, much less
negotiate about it in any meaningful way. It is a confident and
knowledgeable candidate who can inquire, "If I am charged with a crime,
will this organization provide counsel?" In reality, to the extent that they
think about the topic at all, most employees simply rely that, in the event of
a criminal investigation, the organization's interest will align with their
own.140
It is precisely when parties are so lacking in knowledge or bargaining
power that the application of a contract model becomes contorted. While
the courts have used the equitable doctrine of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing'41 to ameliorate the distortions caused by asymmetric
knowledge and bargaining power, there are limits to the application of such
doctrines. The covenant is applicable only after a contract is found to
exist; it plays no role in determining contract formation.142 While applying
135. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089,
1090-91 (1981).
136. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
138. Brudney, supra note 123, at 1404.
139. Macaulay, supra note 133, at 469 ("Continuing relationships are not necessarily nice. The
value of arrangements locks some people into dependent positions. They can only take orders.").
140. Karlan, supra note 130, at 374 (observing that both in general and when facing criminal
investigation, the relationship of the employer and employees in modem organizations may be closer to
"joint venturers" than "bargainers").
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING § 205
(1979) (imposing a duty of good faith upon each party to a contract).
142. Id cmt. c ("This Section [§ 205] . . . does not deal with good faith in the formation of a contract.").
See also DeMott, supra note 125, at 893 ("In applying this obligation [of good faith and fair dealing], the
analysis focuses on the parties' relationship following their agreement, not prior to it.").
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the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing contracts dealing with
advancement and indemnification,'4 3 courts have held that such concepts
are to be used with great caution 4 4 and should not to be used to distort the
explicit terms of an agreement.145 Moreover, the implied covenant of good
faith is invoked only for cases before the court; those unable to seek
judicial redress are left to accept whatever advancement provisions are
offered, with whatever "strings" are attached.146
Even, however, in the case of express agreements where advancement
arrangements coincide precisely with traditional notions of contracting, the
use of a contract model is inappropriate. In categorizing a transaction a
contract, the law emphasizes the process of the transaction, rather than the
subject of the transaction. Traditionally, transactions are deemed to be
"contracts" not because of their subject matter, but because of the process
through which they come into existence.' 4 7 Relying on the self-interest of
parties to arrive at a proper valuing of the rights at issues,148 a traditional
objective of contractual jurisprudence is to facilitate and support the
parties' freedom of contract.14 9 In effect, in identifying a transaction as an
enforceable contract, the law presumes that the subject matter is essentially
"private" in nature and that society will be better off-or at least no worse
off-by permitting private parties to come to an agreement.'o However, in
blindly extending the contract model to advancement of fees in criminal
investigation, the law ignored the fact that the risk of criminal sanctions
involves more than private interests. The ability to financially access
knowledgeable counsel has significant implications, not only for the
organization and the targeted employee, but for society as a whole.' Even
more than the distortion of the process of "contracting," it is the myopia of
143. Chamison, 735 A.2d at 920 (holding, in construing a contract for indemnification, that there
exists an obligation of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract) (citations omitted).
144. See, e.g., id. at 921 ("implied covenant [of good faith] cannot contravene the parties' express
agreement and cannot be used to forge a new agreement beyond the scope of the written contract");
Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1998)
("implying obligations of good faith and fair dealing is a cautious enterprise").
145. Cincinnati SMSA Ltd P'ship, 708 A.2d at 992 ("absent grounds for reformation.. . it is not the
proper role of a court to rewrite or supply omitted provisions to a written agreement.").
146. See infra notes 178-91 and accompanying text.
147. See Leff, supra note 123, at 137-38. (identifying five criteria for classifying an arrangement as
a contract but not including subject matter).
148. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS §§ 1-3 (3d ed. 1987) ("Most of
contract law is premised upon a model consisting of two alert individuals, mindful of their self-interest,
hammering out an agreement by a process of hard bargaining.").
149. Id. at §§ 1-4 (noting that the following rationales have been advanced as justifying
enforcement of contracts: "(a) human will either as a source of sovereignty or (b) as a source of moral
compulsion, (c) private autonomy, (d) reliance, and (e) the needs of trade").
150. Brudney, supra note 123 at 1404 ( "[I]f the contract. . . is 'knowingly' and 'feely' made by the
parties, then . . - its performance makes each of the parties better off and creates a pie for society ... .
Such a vision of the world and of the effects of the agreement proclaims private autonomy in the
contract field.").
151. See infra notes 164-77 and accompanying text.
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contract law, which focuses almost exclusively on the interests of the
parties, which makes it an inappropriate framework for analyzing
advancement transactions. At the hypothetical bargaining table, where the
"contract" of advancement is decided, there is no place set for the interests
of the larger community.
B. FRUSTRATING TRADITIONAL GOALS OF ADVANCEMENT
Even in those situations where the arrangement between an
organization and its employees conforms to traditional notions of
contracting, the question remains whether a contractual framework
advances or frustrates the announced goals of the transaction. Legal
classifications are potent analytical tools provided that there exists a
"correlation" between the classification and the purpose of the
transaction.152 Absent such a connection, the use of a legal model impedes,
rather than promotes, the announced objectives of the transaction.
The traditional justification for advancement of legal fees is that it is a
necessary inducement to encourage capable men and women to serve in
positions of responsibility.1 5  Such an objective presumably benefits both
the organization and the larger community, by encouraging efficient and
effective management at all levels of the organization. Yet, it is fair to
conclude that advancement policies play little role in recruiting all but the
highest executive ranks. By making the existence and scope of
advancement the product of an agreement between parties of varying
bargaining power, the contract model creates a two-tiered system, with
explicit contracts providing expansive advancement for top executive
talent, and potentially less protective provisions for all other managers.
Such a model works only if the goal is recruitment of executive talent; in
the context of other employees, use of such a model is irrelevant at best and
pernicious at worst. As one commentator noted, "two violators, subject to
equal fines or judgments, may pay substantially unequal out-of-pocket
amounts based on their negotiating leverage in their corporations." 54
152. Leff, supra note 123, at 135-35 (noting that the correlation between a classification and the
purpose to be achieved may be less precise than another classification which could have been used).
153. Mooney v. Willis-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888,898 (3d Cir. 1953) (observing that
promise of reimbursement is necessary to secure capable individuals); Homestore, 888 A.2d at
211 (noting that advancement attracts capable individuals into corporate service); Fasciana v. Elec. Data
Sys. Corp., 829 A.2d 160, 170 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating that advancement provisions are necessary to
encourage talented people to serve in corporations). But see Marguies, supra note 43, at 60-61 (noting
that during the New Deal expansive advancement provisions were neither viewed as necessary nor
desirable); Oesterle, supra note 25, at 536 (arguing that a lack of cohesive purpose is the greatest
deficiency of the laws protecting executives from personal liability).
154. Oesterle, supra note 25, at n.224.
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Advancement and indemnification provisions have also been justified
as necessary to encourage prudent risk taking,'55  and resistance to
unjustified lawsuits."' Such objectives may be difficult to reconcile with
the policy objectives of organizational criminal liability-deterrence of
corporate misconduct.' Ironically, the very employees who have both the
knowledge and bargaining power to negotiate the most generous provisions
for advancement are frequently the ones with the greatest power to
influence corporate behavior.' As one commentator noted, "[i]mposing
absolute liability on actors at the apex of the corporate hierarchy seems
most likely to serve as an effective control over organizational conduct.
Yet it is precisely here, among top corporate decision makers, that
contractual devices and legal policies function most effectively to deflect
personal legal risks." 59
Copious advancement provisions diminish the executive's "stake" in
deterring corporate misconduct. Yet, when negotiating executive
agreements, an organization has few incentives to limit advancement. 6 0
Advancement costs are frequently paid through the mechanism of
directors' and officers' insurance, with costs embedded in future premium
adjustments. As a result, board members may find it an easy bargaining
chip to trade for concessions on compensation and other benefits which
garner more scrutiny from investors. 161
By making the imposition of a sanction less likely, overly generous
advancement provisions can "tip" the risk/reward equation toward
"imprudent" risk. In the words of one commentator, "the more funding a
person can use to litigate . . . the lower the probability that a sanction will
be imposed. . . . And probability of sanction is at least as important as-
155. Kaung, 884 A.2d at 509 (noting that Delaware advancement provisions are part of a policy to
manage risk/reward balance for organizations); Fasciana, 829 A.2d at 170 (observing that advancement
encourages officers and directors to undertake risk in exchange for lucrative return).
156. Hibbert, 457 A.2d at 343-44 (holding that advancement and indemnification serve the public
policy of encouraging managers to resist unjustified lawsuits).
157. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. U.S., 212 U.S. 481, 496 (1909) (reasoning that imposition
of organizational criminal liability is necessary to control misconduct). See also Robson, supra note 49,
at 121 (observing that both courts and scholars readily accepted deterrence as a goal of organizational
criminal liability); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109
HARv. L. REv. 1477 (1996) (noting that imposition of corporate criminal liability was necessary to
deter misconduct but suggesting that it has outlived its usefulness).
158. Bucy, supra note 24, at 286 (arguing that bylaws and corporate resolutions providing
indemnification tend to favor corporate executives); Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the
Firm, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1613, 1656 (2007) (observing that indemnification and advancement are likely
to be used by agents who have the greatest influence policies on indemnification).
159. Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Cost of Legal Controls, 93 YALE
L. J. 857, 859 (1984).
160. Margulies, supra note 43, at 81 (arguing that when fees are being subsidized by the
organization, neither the targeted executive nor the board of directors has incentives to hold down
costs).
161. Id at 83 (noting that details of D&O insurance "fly under the radar").
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many have concluded more important than-severity of sanction in
determining the effectiveness of legal prohibitions in deterring
violations."162 Ironically, the diminution in deterrence would appear to be
greatest in those cases involving intentional conduct which could be
influenced by an analytical risk/reward analysis.6 3
Encapsulating advancement within a contractual framework as a
private matter between organizations and their agents prevents any
meaningful consideration of whether advancement is serving its announced
objectives, much less whether such objectives are appropriate in the context
of a criminal proceeding. In clinging to a contract model which elevates
the form of the transaction over the purpose to be served by advancement,
the law appears driven more by intellectual economy than reflective
considerations of public policy.
C. INSULATING ADVANCEMENT FROM COMMUNITY INTERESTS
Thoughtful consideration suggests that the use of a contract model to
analyze advancement in criminal proceedings distorts traditional notions of
contracting and frequently frustrates the announced goals of advancement.
However, the greatest risk in forcing advancement into a contract model is
not that it is an imperfect fit, but that it is an inappropriate subject of a
contract at all. Uncritical adoption of a contractual infrastructure
effectively prevents consideration of what purpose advancement should
serve and whether the contract paradigm advances that purpose.
In the context of a white collar investigation, all constituencies-the
targeted employee, the organization, and the larger community-have a
legitimate interest in ensuring a fair process and an accurate outcome. 164
When properly structured, advancement of fees can play a critical role in
promoting such interests; when improvidently distributed, advancement
can distort the administration of criminal justice, with the potential for
significant adverse impact beyond the organization and its agent.
The financial access to counsel which is provided by advancement can
reduce the risk of "false positives"-the conviction of a factually innocent
defendant.165  Early access to knowledgeable counsel can be crucial in
162. Buell, supra note 158, at 1655 (footnote omitted).
163. Id. (suggesting that deterrence is most effective in the context of intentional violations); Lynn
M. LoPucki, The Death afLiability, 106 YALE L. REv.1, 72 (1996) (arguing that, unlike unintentional,
violations, purely intended events are completely "deterrable").
164. Brown, supra note 121, at 365 (suggesting that the operative principle regarding access to
counsel is not only fairness but effectiveness of criminal law enforcement); Karlan, supra note 132, at
689 (arguing that the interests of a defendant and the criminal justice system in avoiding false pusitivcs
"dovetail").
165. Karlan, supra notel130, at 689 (defining false positives as those occurrences when the positive
answer to the question of guilt is incorrect).
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determining whether a charge is brought' and how the targeted defendant
is treated. 167 Not only is such procedural fairness important to the targeted
defendant, it affirms the legitimacy of the system.16 8  Legitimacy is
particularly important in the context of organizational crime, where
individual and corporate cooperation are essential to determine not only
who has committed a crime, but whether a crime has been committed at
all."' A process which is seen as fair is more likely to encourage
cooperation; conversely, where inadequate representation skews the
outcome toward liability, the result can be an "adversarial culture of
resistance"o that makes compliance less certain and enforcement more
171
expensive.
Balanced against the community interest in avoiding "false positives,"
is its interest in avoiding "false negatives"-a scenario in which the guilty
go free.172  Not surprisingly, defendants have enormous incentive to use
every resource to generate a "false negative" and avoid punishment.'73  As
one commentator noted, "defense resources should be scant when they hurt
accuracy and ample when they aid it." 74  When financial resources are
abundant, defendants in criminal cases may "overlitigate," with
questionable outcomes."' When the defense is subsidized by "other
people's money," there is virtually no incentive to be frugal.176  As one
observer noted, when facing criminal charges, the direction of corporate
166. In the context of white collar prosecution, the existence of "secondary offenses" such as
obstruction of justice or lying to the prosecutor raises the possibility that an employee may be convicted
of a crime which is committed after the investigation has begun. In Computer Associates International,
for example, an executive pleaded guilty to a charge of obstruction based upon false statements made in
a report that the executive knew would be submitted to the prosecutor. Indictment, 11 51-59, 75-79,
United States v. Kumar, Cr. No. 04 Cr. 0846 (E.D. N.Y. Sept. 20,2004).
167. Brown, supra note 121, at 376 (noting that targeted employees who are represented by counsel
can negotiate concessions for their cooperation with the investigation).
168. Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime and the Contingency of Criminal Liability,
14 U. PA. L. REv. 1295, 1303-04 (2001) (describing a "crisis of legitimacy" in criminal prosecution
which undermines efforts to promote compliance).
169. Buell, supra note 158, at 1627 (contrasting street crime, where the principle challenge is
collection of evidence, with some white collar crimes where the investigation focuses on whether a
crime was committed at all).
170. Brown, supra note 168, at 1306.
171. Id. (describing the efforts to use collaboration and cooperation to reduce corporate
misconduct).
172. Karlan, supra note 130, at 689 (defining "false negatives" as occurring where the negative
answer to the question of guilt is incorrect).
173. Brown, supra note 121, at 373 (noting that defendants have incentives to overlitigate cases to
avoid the "day of reckoning").
174. Id. at 374.
175. Id. at 373-74 (arguing that wealthy defendants can overlitigate cases resulting in unmerited
acquittals).
176. Margulies, supra note 43, at 81 (observing that executives have little incentive to hold down
litigation costs).
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executives to their lawyers is: "[D]o everything you can to keep me out of
jail. Very little thought is given to cost. It is not a concern.""
For those executives with the knowledge and bargaining power to
negotiate an explicit contract, advancement provisions can be generous-
generous enough to prove that "the earth is flat."178  For mid-level
managers without express agreements, however, an organization's proffer
of advancement may come with gossamer strings designed to align the
employee's legal strategy with that of the organization. In the context of
criminal proceedings, organizations frequently advance fees because it is in
their self-interest to do so. The same misconduct that is sufficient to
support charges against individual employees can be the basis of an
indictment against the organization. 179  Consequently, the legal strategy of
an individual defendant can have a material impact on the organization's
own defense. While a complete vindication of an employee target benefits
the organization by making it less likely that the organization will be found
guilty, an employee's pursuit of vindication is not without risks to the
organization. Conviction of an individual defendant might foreclose
certain defenses in the organization's own trial' or may provide potential
plaintiffs with information for use in subsequent civil cases.'"' Conversely,
an employee's decision to accept an offer of immunity in exchange for
informationl8 may supply prosecutors with sufficient evidence to charge
other employees or the organization itself. It is not surprising, therefore,
that when facing investigation and potential criminal charges, organizations
naturally seek to use advancement of fees to align the behavior and legal
strategy of their employees in support of the company's own interest.
Absent a blatant abuse of discretion,18 3 organizations may condition
advancement on selection of counsel provisions which require individuals
to choose from counsel who have been approved by the organization. 18 4
177. Carie Johnson, After the Enron Trial, Defense Firm Is Stuck with the Tab, WASH. POST, June
16, 2006, at Dl (quoting John Marquess, president of a New Jersey firm which monitors legal fees).
178. Dunlap, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *19 (citing the contention of the corporate employer that
claimant's hiring of accounting firm to perform forensic accounting was equivalent of trying to prove
that the earth is flat).
179. N.Y Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 212 U.S. at 494 (holding that corporations are vicariously
liable for the actions of their agents); U. S. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F. 2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972)
(holding that corporations are criminally liable for acts of employees committed within the scope of
employment even when the acts contravene the directives of the corporation).
180. Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 38 N.Y.S. 2d 270, 275 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942) af d, 47
N.Y.S. 2d 589 (1944) (observing that an executive's plea of nolo contendere benefited the corporation
since the plea could not be used as evidence against the company).
181. Bucy, supra note 24, at 346 (suggesting that potential collateral estoppel effect of criminal
action in a subsequent civil suit may be the reason that corporations advance fees).
182. Buell, supra note 158, at 1647 (proffer of immunity may induce targeted employees to make
statements).
183. Chamison v. Healthtrust Inc., 735 A.2d at 922-23 (holding that a selection of counsel
provision cannot be construed so broadly as to require a defendant to accept inferior counsel).
184. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8 §145 (e) (2009) (advancement may be made on such terms and
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Even absent such a provision, the very act of advancing fees provides an
organization with significant influence over employees. Employees
frequently retain counsel who have been "recommended" by the
organization.' Not surprisingly, corporations frequently recommend
counsel whose approach will be compatible with the organization's own
legal strategy.' 86  Some scholars suggest that that employees' use of
recommended counsel, who routinely benefit from regular referrals, may
promote "stonewalling" even when cooperation might be in the employee's
best interest.' 87 It can be difficult to determine when it is appropriate for
employees to secure their own counsel.' The common practice is to
procure separate counsel where it is "sufficiently clear" that an employee's
interests are adverse to that of the company' 89 or wait until an employee
makes a reasonable request for separate counsel.'90
Whatever ethical dilemmas are raised by an organization's
advancement policies appear to be laid solely at the feet of counsel;"'9 there
appear to be few ethical constraints on the organization which advances the
fees. Even when organizations advance fees to employees for the best of
reasons-an effort to build trust 92 or fulfill ethical obligationsl 93-the mere
conditions as the corporation deems appropriate); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.58(a) (2007) (providing
that corporation may limit indemnification or advancement by a provision in its articles of
incorporation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.521, subd. 4 (2004) (providing that articles or bylaws may
impose limits or conditions on advancement).
185. Buell, supra note 158, at 1633 (observing that although given the opportunity to choose their
own lawyers and eschew joint defense arrangements, employees seldom do).
186. JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 314-15 (1991) (stating that making recommendations to
employees who were the subject of criminal investigation, Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.
recommended "friendly" attorneys who had received previous referrals from counsel retained by
Drexel).
187. Margulies, supra note 43, at n.91 (stating that lawyers for corporations maintain a network of
other lawyers, who are dependent on referrals, and who might influence a client against cooperation,
even against the client's best interest); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69,
126 (1995) (describing a hypothetical attorney whose desire for future fees and referrals taints her
representation of targeted employees).
188. Sarah Helene Duggin, The McNulty Memorandum, the KPMG Decision and Corporate
Cooperation: Individual Rights and Legal Ethics, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341, 406-07 (2008)
(discussing approaches used by counsel to advise employees during internal investigations, including a
corporate version of a Miranda warning).
189. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 14, at 94.
19 0. Id.
191. Oesterle, supra note 25, at 566 (noting that the only check on organizational influence over the
legal strategy of targeted defendant is the lawyer's code of ethics). See also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-23 (1983) (acknowledging that organizations who pay for legal services for
others may exert pressure on such lawyers in order to advance their own objectives); Duggin, supra
note 188, at 348 (arguing that corporate cooperation controversy must be solved within the system of
legal ethics).
192. John Hasnas, Managing the Risks of Legal Compliance: Conflicting Demands of Law and
Ethics, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 507, 516-17 (2008) (instituting programs of procedural justice encourages
employee compliance and law-abidingness); Stein, supra note 119, at 3249 (observing that many
corporations believe that payment of legal expenses boosts morale and is required by fundamental
fairness).
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existence of an organizational "benefactor" who advances legal fees may
create so many entanglements as to overwhelm even the best intentioned
system of organizational ethics. As one commentator noted, "there are
times when any individual will find it hard to hear a warning, no matter
what is said, in the context of an internal investigation. There are also
times when simple actions, or the manner in which cautionary statements
are delivered, can impact how an employee responds . . . 194 Far from
addressing these challenges, the use of a contract model "papers over"
ethical issues by allocating advancement based on bargaining power and
perceived self-interest. A contract model allocates "too much" counsel to
those with significant bargaining power, and imposes real or psychological
restrictions on those who lack the knowledge or power to negotiate a more
equitable arrangement. Supported by the framework of contract law, the
organization is generally free to pursue its own goals, 195 unconstrained by
the interests of the targeted employees or the community at large. While
determination of the optimal deployment of advancement of legal expenses
in criminal matters is both complex and imprecise, a model which excludes
consideration of the interests of key constituencies is bound to be
inadequate.
IV. DISCARDING THE CONTRACT MODEL OF ADVANCEMENT
FOR CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
The importance of advancement decisions in the prosecution of white
collar crime has not gone unnoticed. Commentators have reported on the
excesses of advancement which leaves shareholders "footing the bill" for
the misconduct of greedy employees;1 96 they have explored how
advancement might undercut the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions;197
and they have highlighted how advancement is one factor which
distinguishes prosecution of white collar crime from street crime.198 Such
193. Hasnas, supra note 192, at 521 (arguing that organizations have an ethical obligation to treat
employees who are under suspicion fairly).
194. Duggin, supra note 188, at 405.
195. But see supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text describing the equitable limits on
interpreting contacts.
196. Bucy, supra note 24, at 317-19 (arguing that the current provisions on advancement permit
executives to receive indemnification without meeting statutory standards); Oesterle, supra note 24, at
545-46 (stating that courts have been -surprisingly lenient" in approving board decisions on
advancement, especially since the advances are not likely to be repaid); Rossman, supra note 28, at 41
(noting that the right to advancement is not forfeited by the claimant's misconduct or self-interest).
197. Bucy, supra note 24, at 342 (positing that the scope of indemnification and advancement
provisions may help to encourage or discourage white collar crime); Margulies, supra note 43, at
nn.49-53 (arguing that payment of legal fees to corporate wrongdoers may create moral hazard and
encourage a "race to the bottom").
198. Brown, supra note 121, at 370-71 (observing that in the context of street crime, courts and
legislatures effectively determine access to legal assistance by setting funding levels for counsel and
expert assistance); Buell, supra note 158, at 1633-34 (contrasting advancement of legal fees,
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concerns are reflected in statutory schemes which purport to reposition
advancement to better balance competing interests. What commentators
and legislatures fail to realize, however, is that judicial and statutory efforts
to recalibrate advancement decisions are likely to fall short as long as the
contract model is the operative system used to consider advancement.
A. INADEQUACIES OF CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEMES
While advancement of legal fees has been the subject of legislation in
all states, such statutes essentially preserve the contract model;' 9 9 even in
the context of criminal proceedings, advancement is considered a private
matter between the parties. 0 0 Legislation adopting a permissive structure,
such as Delaware, has been described as "strikingly lax,"20 1 essentially
abdicating responsibility to the parties themselves.2 02
Even in those states which have adopted an "opt-out" model of
advancemento203organizations are still free to structure advancement as
they deem appropriate, with few checks beyond their own self-interest.204
While the imposition of an affirmative action to "opt-out" of the statutory
regime makes such regimes potentially more restrictive than permissive
arrangements, the "opt-out" approach "tweaks" rather than replaces the
contract model. The Minnesota statute,205 which follows the opt-out model,
offers a more comprehensive framework than other jurisdictions, with
some attempt to balance the interest of multiple constituencies.206 As with
other opt-out jurisdictions, once an organization has "opted out," it has
discretion on whether to restrict or condition advancement or prohibit it
completely. 207  Unlike typical opt-out statutes, however, the Minnesota
statute requires that any limitation on advancement to apply equally to "all
persons within a given class."208 Despite this effort to consider other
constituencies, the effort falls short. The statute does not define "class;"
recommendation of counsel and joint defense agreements, typical of white collar cases, with legal
representation in street crimes).
199. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 99-119 and accompanying text.
201. Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., 2004 WL 556733, at *10 n.71 (Del. Ch. March 22, 2004).
202. Id at *3 (observing that it is left for organizations themselves to weigh need to attract talented
managers against the potential costs to shareholders).
203. See supra notes 32-34, and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 35-37, 197-214 and accompanying text.
205. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.521 (2004).
206. See, e.g., id. § 302A.521, subdiv. (6) (providing for detailed procedure for determining
eligibility), subdiv. (8) (providing for notice to shareholders post payment);and subdiv. (4) (requiring
equal benefits for employees within the same class).
207. Id. at subdiv. (4) (2008) (providing that articles or bylaws may prohibit advancement); Barry v.
Barry, 824 F. Supp. 178, 183 (D. Minn. 1993), affd, 28 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 1Q94) (holding that
Minnesota statute makes advancement mandatory unless organization elects to prohibit or limit in
bylaws).
208. MnIN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.521, subdiv. (4) (2004).
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presumably, organizations are free to continue to offer more generous
advancement provisions to "executives," provided that all "executives" are
treated similarly. Moreover, nothing in the Minnesota statute prohibits
organizations from recommending counsel or providing advancement of
legal fees only for counsel acceptable to the organization.2 09 In addition,
the Minnesota statute vests organizations with complete discretion to
determine the amount that they elect to advance.210 Although the statute
announces a bias toward ''reimbursement" and against
"overcompensation,"2 11 it does so in the context of avoiding claims for
indemnification for expenses which were already paid by insurance. 212 It is
silent with regard to either minimum or maximum limits of advancement.
Lastly, and most importantly, the statute announces that its primary
purpose is "reward and protection." 213 Specifically, the provision "rewards
and protects from financial injury those persons who have conducted
themselves in an honest manner with respect to their dealings with the
corporation. "214 While a laudable goal, the statute provides no mechanism
or guidance to ensure that such provisions do not "reward and protect"
imprudent risk taking and criminal behavior. Cordoned within a contract
model, matters such as the scope and conditions of advancement are left to
the determination of the parties, presumably without regard to the interests
of any constituencies who are not a party to the agreement.
At the federal level, the proposed Attorney Client Privilege Protection
Act2 15 misses an opportunity to consider the issue of advancement in the
scheme of white collar prosecutions and to attempt to properly balance the
interests of all parties. The Act, initially introduced in response to the
governmental policies of the Thompson Memorandum,2 16  prohibits
209. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.521, subdiv. (4) (specifically permitting organizations to impose
"conditions" on advancement). Presumably such conditions would include selection of counsel
provisions.





215. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2009, S 445, 111th Cong. (2009); Attorney-Client
Privilege Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4326, 111th Cong. (2009).
216. The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006 was introduced in the Senate to ensure
inter alia that advancement of fees to target employees, as well as joint defense agreements and
information sharing would not be considered by prosecutors in evaluating organizational cooperation.
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, S.30, 109th Cong. § 3(a) (2006). Although the 2006
Act was not reported out of Committee, revised versions were introduced in 2007, 2008 and 2009 to
address the issues first raised by the Thompson Memorandum and in reaction to perceived inadequacies
in the revised guideline issued by the Department of Justice. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act
of 2007, 5. 186, I110th Cong. (2007); Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007 H.R. 3013,
110th Cong. (2007); Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, 5. 3217, 110th Cong. (2008);
Attorney Client Privilege Protection Act of 2009, 5. 445, 111th Cong. (2009); Attorney-Client Privilege
Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4326, 111th Cong. (2009).
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prosecutors from considering the provision of counsel or advancement of
legal fees or expenses to an employee in evaluating organizational
cooperation with an investigation.2 17 While the Act would permit a
prosecutor to consider advancement of fees as a part of an overall scheme
of obstruction,2 18 the Act fails to identify when advancement becomes so
excessive as to constitute obstruction or to specify a "safe harbor" of
appropriate advancement levels. By failing to define the contours of
advancement, the Act does little more than make a "private" agreement
even more private by shielding it from prosecutor scrutiny except in the
most extreme circumstances.
B. A DUTY MODEL OF ADVANCEMENT
The term "duty" is an umbrella term, covering a myriad of relations
and obligations, both legal219 and ethical.2 20 Perhaps the most significant
distinction between contractual obligations and other legal and ethical
duties is the consideration of interests beyond those of the immediate
parties to the contract. In construing a contract, a court is almost
exclusively concerned with the interests and positions of the parties
themselves; it need not look beyond the metaphorical bargaining table.
While equitable principles such as the implied obligation to act in good
faith,221 the strictures on exploitation of vulnerable parties 222 or the
prohibition on misrepresentations in the bargaining process 223 been used by
the law to moderate contractual terms deemed egregious, such doctrines are
primarily intended as protections to the parties to the transaction, with any
benefit to other stakeholders being wholly incidental.224 Such
217. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2009, S. 445, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2009); Attorney-
Client Privilege Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4326, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2009).
218. Id.
219. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 580 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a "duty" as "a legal obligation that is
owed or due to another that needs to be satisfied"). Black's Law Dictionary identifies thirty-one types
or classification of duties, including a "noncontractural duty" which arises independently of a contract.
Id.
220. Edward Soule, Trust and Managerial Responsibility, 8 Bus. ETHICS Q. 249, 268 (1995)
(employers who actively encourage employees to trust them create moral obligations toward such
employees); John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 579, 648
(2005) (fostering trust requires assumption of a duty by the trusted actor to protect the interests of the
vulnerable party).
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING § 205
(1979) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement.").
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: WHEN UNDUE INFLUENCE MAKES A CONTRACT
VOIDABLE § 177(1) (1979) (providing that a contract is voidable if assent was the result of unfair undue
influence exerted by a person in a dominant relationship).
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: WHEN A MISREPRESENTATION MAKES A CONTRACT
VOIDABLE § 164(1) (1979) (providing that a contract is voidable if agreement was induced because of a
material misrepresentation upon which a party reasonably relied).
224. DeMott, supra note 125, at 905-06 (observing that contractual doctrines which address
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considerations, however, have rarely been used to void either advancement
or indemnification agreements.225 In contrast, in those instances where a
court or legislature discerns a noncontractual duty, the law strikes a
balance, not only between the rights and obligations of the immediate
parties, but all similarly situated parties, without regard to their effective
bargaining power. 2 26
The traditional definition of "duty"-a "legal obligation that is owed
to another" 227-begs the question of when a duty should be discerned.
While there appears to be consensus that a duty arises because of a
"relationship" between the parties, 228  the determination of which
relationships give rise to a duty and the scope of such duty is one of
"shifting sands." 229  A court which did attempt to articulate a standard
observed that the imposition of a duty turns on "whether the imposition of
such a duty satisfies an abiding sense of basic fairness under all of the
circumstances in light of the considerations of public policy." 230  In a
general sense, the imposition of a duty occurs when the contract paradigm
is somehow inadequate, either because of the relationship of the parties or
the nature of the subject matter makes the use of a contract model
inadequate.231 Both the process of "contracting" and the critical role of
advancement in criminal proceedings233 suggest that advancement of legal
fees is simply not an appropriate subject for contracting. Freed of the
strictures of contract analysis, courts and legislatures alike would be likely
to take a fresh look at advancement in the context of the larger public
policy issues which it presents.
The distinction between a contractual framework of advancement and
a duty model is not merely of academic interest. Unlike the current
contract model which confines judicial analysis to the four corners of the
document, a duty analysis would require courts to consider interests beyond
misconduct focus on the unfairness of the transaction to one of the parties to the contract).
225. Bucy, supra note 24, at 314 (courts have ignored public policy considerations in analyzing
indemnification and advancement); Rossman, supra note 28, at 39 (noting that courts have required
advancement notwithstanding allegations of misconduct, even when allegations are made by the
corporation itself).
226. As one commentator noted on the discernment of a duty, "[E]ach duty itself defines the types
of relationship to which it applies . . . . [E]ach duty exacts its own standard of acceptable conduct from
the fiduciary to whom it applies." DeMott, supra note 125, at 915 n.160 (quoting P. Finn, FIDUCIARY
OBLIGATIONs 4 (1977)).
227. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 580 (9th ed. 2009).
228. William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1953) (arguing that the
consensus of opinion suggests that a duty arises out of a "'relation" between parties).
229. Id at 14.
230. Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1116 (N.J. 1993).
231. Cf DeMott, supra note 125, at 892-09 (contrasting the obligations of a fiduciary duty with the
contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing and suggesting that fiduciary duties transcend
contractual obligations).
232. See supra notes 136-46 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 165 77 and accompanying text.
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those of the immediate parties. This was the approach of the court in
Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Felicetti.234  The
claimants in Felicetti sought advancement of fees for defense of a criminal
matter based on a corporate bylaw which provided for mandatory
advancement.235 The directors rejected the claim, relying on language in
the bylaws that required the directors to act in the best interests of the
company. 236 The board found that since the undertaking to repay the
advance if the claimant was found culpable was "illusory," it was not in the
best interests of the company to advance fees.23 7 In upholding the
directors' decision, the court observed that the directors, having determined
that advancement of fees was not in the best interest of the shareholders,
had a fiduciary duty to reject advancement.238 In effect, the Felicetti court
recognized a duty that superseded a contractual obligation providing for
advancement. However, Felicetti stands alone; other courts have either
distinguished the case on its factS239 or effectively rejected its reasoning
outright, 240 effectively insulating agreements from considering the interests
of third parties. Moreover, even in Felicetti, the court considered only the
duty of the directors to the shareholders; there was no consideration of the
larger interests at play in a criminal proceeding. By shifting their "viewing
point" from a contractual vantage point to a duty perspective, courts would
be more likely to weigh the "agreement" of the parties against the larger
purposes of advancement and to explicitly consider the impact of the
arrangement on other stakeholders.
C. THE CONTOURS OF A DUTY To ADVANCE FEES
A shift from a contract paradigm to a duty model would inevitably
trigger consideration of the contour of the duty-a rebalancing of interests
of all stakeholders. Although judicial importation of a duty model is
possible, recasting advancement in terms of a statutory duty would appear
to offer a greater opportunity for transparency and consistency. Framed in
a duty model, statutes would effectively take advancement "off the table"
234. 830 F.Supp. 262, 268 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
235. Id at 268. Although Felicetti applied Pennsylvania law, the court observed that the
Pennsylvania statute was modeled on the Delaware statutes and the MBCA. Id
236. Id at 270.
237. Idat264-65.
238. Idat 270.
239. Neal, 667 A.2d at 482 (1995) (distinguishing Felicetti, by observing that the instant case
presented no conflict between the by-law provision and fiduciary duty of directors); Ridder, 47 F.3d at
87 (holding that Felicetti construed Pennsylvania law and should not be applied in a case involving
Delaware law). But see supra note 235.
240. Ridder, 47 F.3d at 87 (distinguishing Felicetti by noting that it is rare that directors could
breach a fiduciary duty by complying with a duly approved bylaw). But see Felicetti, 830 F. Supp. at
270 (disfinguishing other Delaware case law by noting that in prior cases bylaw had not conflicted with
fiduciary duties of the directors).
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as a matter of private bargaining. Organizations would no longer have
discretion on whether or when to advance fees, nor would they be able to
"opt-out" of statutory mandates. While defining the exact contours of the
duty to advance legal fees is outside the scope of this article, consideration
of current practices suggest that any legislation on advancement would
have to address a number of key issues.
The determination of when an employee is entitled to advancement of
legal fees and expenses and how long advances are available has enormous
implications for the individual employee, the organizational employer and
the criminal justice system. In the context of white collar crime, legal
representation is critical in determining how the investigation proceeds and
whether charges are filed.24' Whether advancement of legal fees should be
available at the investigatory stage of a white collar proceeding, or, as
comparable with street crime, only at the charging stage, 242 is an important
issue which should not be left to the bargaining of private parties.
The duration of advancement also has significant impact, not only on
targeted employees, but also on the community as a whole. While some
statutes require an initial evaluation of whether there exist facts which
would make a recipient ineligible for advancement, 243 no subsequent
evaluation is required. This can result in a situation where the termination
of advancement becomes less likely as the case progresses than at the time
of the initial evaluation, even though more facts may emerge which suggest
that a recipient is not eligible for indemnification. Presumably, had the
claimant in the Bergonzi case pled guilty prior to receiving his initial
advancement of attorneys' fees, denial of advancement might have been
justified; ironically, however, his subsequent admission was insufficient to
terminate the organization's obligation to advance fees. 244
In addition to the commencement and duration of advancement,
determining "how much" of a benefit a claimant receives raises important
issues of fairness and efficiency. Under a contract model, there is virtually
no check on the amount of organizational resources that can be advanced.
Unlike street crime, where access to counsel is effectively "regulated" by
the government through provision of funds for appointed counsel,245 the
contract model of advancement imposes no minimums or maximums on
the amounts advanced, and no requirement of equitable treatment among
241. Brown, supra note 121, at 378 (observing that provision of counsel by an organization to
employee targets during the investigative stage affords them an advantage over the discrete
representation typical of street criminals).
242. Id at 377 (observing that right to court appoint counsel occurs at the charging stage).
243. See Rossman, supra note 28, at n.43 for a list of states requiring a preliminary factual inquiry
pnrior to advancing fees.
244. See supra notes 51 55 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bergunzi.
245. Brown, supra note 121, at 373 (legislatures set de facto limits on availability of counsel to
indigent defendants by setting funding levels which act as a disincentive for attorneys to overlitigate
cases).
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employees. While the ability of an organization to restrict or curtail fees
may leave some targeted employees vulnerable to organizational
pressure,o246other putative defendants in white collar cases may have the
full resources of the company available for their defense.2 47  Even the
forfeiture statutes 248 which have been used by prosecutors to limit a
defendant's access to financial resources are less of a restriction in white
collar crimes. Such statutes are available only if it can be shown that the
forfeited assets are the result of a defendant's criminal activity249-a
difficult task when advancement is made in accordance with the terms of a
pre-existing contract or through an insurance policy. Even where there
exists an allegation that the actions of an individual defendant justify
forfeiture, courts have still permitted of payment of advances by the
organizational employer into an escrow account, 2 50 effectively preserving
them for future distribution.
The determination of what is the appropriate amount of advancement
is bound to be frustrating and imprecise. However, it seems clear that a
model which acknowledges interests beyond those of the immediate parties
is likely to be an improvement over the current system which leaves each
party to strike the best deal possible, without regard to the interests of the
larger community. While simply recasting advancement in a duty analysis
rather than a contract analysis will not result in an automatic rebalancing of
all constituent interests, a conscious repudiation of the contract model is the
first step toward freeing courts and legislatures to consider the interests
beyond those of the parties to the agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
The issue of advancement in criminal proceedings is too important to
be left to the vagaries of totally private negotiation between parties with
disparate bargaining power and sophistication. The use of such a model
circumscribes judicial review and diverts legislative focus from
comprehensive consideration of all of the constituencies affected in the
prosecution of white collar crime. A shift from a contract model to a duty
246. See supra notes 179-91 and accompanying text.
247. Brown, supra note 121, at 378-79 (observing that defense resources in white collar crime cases
can frequently match the government's resources).
248. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 853(b) (2006) (requiring forfeiture of all property derived from
commission of a crime); 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (2006) (authorizing forfeiture of money traceable to
money laundering); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3681-82 (2006) (providing for forfeiture of defendant's profits from
movies, books and other media related to the crime, but allowing twenty percent of such profits for use
as attorneys' fees).
249. 211 US.C. § 853(a); 18 U.S.C. § 982(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3681(a).
250. See United States v. Wittig, No. 03-40142-JAR, 2004 WL 1490406 (D. Kan. June 30, 2004),
modified, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D. Kan. 2004), reinstated, 2005 WL 1227914 (D. Kan. May 23, 2005)
(court ordered corporation to pay attorneys' fees it owed under its bylaws into escrow).
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model would be the first step toward a fresh look at advancement in
criminal cases.
It is understandable that every white collar defendant would wish to
retain services of a litigator as skilled and eloquent as Daniel Webster.
However, who should "pay" for Daniel Webster-whether in terms of
money, influence, accuracy, or efficiency-presents complicated issues
which should be settled, not in the insularity of a bargain, but in the
definition of a duty which considers the interests of all of the actors-even
those of the devil himself
